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Towards a Unitary Radical Pragmatic Account
Stavroula Tsiplakou"
1 Introduction
The Greek connective ke 'and' performs a variety of functions, some of
which are more unexpected than others, and the challenge is to provide an
economical and unitary treatment for all. Within (neo-)Gricean pragmatics
the tendency is for natural language connectives such as and. but. or, there
fore to be treated as equivalent to the logical connectives a, v, -» etc., and
any additional functions are taken to be a result of implicature. This type of
pragmatic analysis arguably falls short of instances of asymmetric conjunc
tion, especially in view of the age-old argument that interpretive differences
due to pragmatic processes should be irrelevant to truth-conditions, a claim
which is very obviously invalidated by the data. In this paper I show that the
problem outlined above can be circumvented and a unitary radical pragmatic
analysis of the seemingly multiple functions of the Greek connective ke can
be attained within a relevance-theoretic approach. I assume that it is not
propositions but pragmatically enriched utterances that arc assigned truth-
conditions and I suggest that particles like ke function as semantic con
straints on relevance in that they act as guides delimiting the process of
pragmatic interpretation and constraining processing effort in specific ways;
1 show that the seemingly multiple pragmatic readings that ke induces can be
accounted for by treating ke as an operator carrying the semantic feature 'ad
ditive', which makes it focalizing and prcsuppositional.
2 The Trouble with Natural Language
Connectives
This paper addresses some seemingly puzzling properties of the Greek con
nective ke 'and' and an attempt is made to show that the varying pragmatic
readings induced in conjunction involving At are not erratic and uncon-
•Warmest thanks arc due to Costas Canakis for extensively discussing the pro
posed analysis with me and to the audience at the 28th Pcnn Linguistics Colloquium,
where this paper was initially presented, for a number of very useful comments and
suggestions. All errors remain mine, as usual.
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strained but a uniform treatment is possible within a radical pragmatic
framework such as Relevance theory. One of the most interesting aspects of
Relevance theory is its re-casting of the semantics-pragmatics 'divide' in
terms of the distinction between explicature and implicature, which is of
particular relevance to the analysis I will be proposing.
Natural language connectives such as and, but, or, therefore etc. are
troublesome in that they seem to carry 'semantic' content over and above
that of their logical counterparts a, v, -> etc.; such additional semantic con
tent demonstrably affects the truth-conditional content of the utter
ances/propositions they conjoin. However, such purportedly semantic con
tent is not always clearly definable. Natural language connectives are there
fore particularly pertinent to the precise delimitation of the semantics-
pragmatics 'divide'.
2.1 Some Examples
The examples below all involve and, since this is the connective on which
this paper focuses. While in example (1) and seems to carry no more seman
tic content than its logical counterpart (a),
(1) a. Sophia goes to work and John stays at home,
b. John stays at home and Sophia goes to work.
as the order of the two conjuncts can be reversed with no effect on the truth-
conditions of the whole, this is not the case with what has been termed
asymmetric conjunction (Schmerling, 1975):
(2) a. The road was icy. She slipped.
b. She slipped. The road was icy.
c. The road was icy and she slipped.
d. She slipped and the road was icy.
A comparison between (2a) and (2b) on the one hand and (2c) and (2d)
on the other indicates that while in (2a) and (2b) any additional temporal or
causal link between the two conjuncts is a result of pragmatic interpretation,
this is not the case when the connective is present; in (2c) it seems that the
lemporal/causal interpretation is induced in virtue of some kind of additional
semantic content carried by the connective, as, if this were not the case, the
truth-conditions of (2d) would be identical to those of (2c). The idea that
connectives are hence amenable to a semantic treatment is quite widely
spread in the literature (see, for example, Bar-Lev and Palacas, 1980, and,
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more recently, Asher and Lascarides, 1998; Gomez Txurruka, 2003). As
indicated by the examples in (3), the semantic approach faces the obvious
problem of being forced to allow for wild proliferation of lexical meanings
for the connective:
(3) a. I walked into the room and the cat was eating a ba
nana.
b. I walked into the kitchen and the cat had eaten all the
bananas.
c. Slav can't spell and she's a linguist.
d. I had a great meal last week and I went to Burger
King.
Moreover, these purportedly distinct lexical meanings are not always clearly
definable (cf. (3a) and (3b)) and seem to be largely dependent on intonation
and context (cf. (3d); sec Blakemore and Carston, 1999 for a full discussion).
3 The Greek Connective ke
The Greek connective ke/ki 'and' performs a variety of functions, some of
which are more unexpected than others. Traditional grammars of Greek (cf.
Tzartzanos, 1948/1991) distinguish between 'connective', 'adverbial' and
'intensificr' ke, among others; several of these descriptive distinctions have
been taken up and recast in more theoretical terms in recent linguistic work
on ke (Canakis, 1995; Kitis, 1995).
Examples (4-8) illustrate some of the more expected uses
ofke.
(4) a. i sofia dulcvi ke o janis meni spiti
Sophia works and John stays at home.
b. o janis meni spiti ke i sofia dulevi
John stays at home and Sophia works.
(5) a. klidosa ke cfiya
I locked up and left,
b. efiya ke klioosa
I left and I locked up.
(6) a. ylistrisa ke epesa
I slipped and I fell,
b. epesa ke ylistrisa
I fell and slipped.
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(7) kaOomuna stin kuzina ke akuya radjofono
I was sitting in the kitchen and I was listening to the ra
dio.
(8) a. i stavrula den kseri orGoyrafia ke inc ylosoloyos
Stavroula doesn't know how to spell and she's a linguist,
b. i stavrula ine ylosoloyos ke Acn kseri orOoyrafia
Stavroula is a linguist and she doesn't know how to spell.
In (4) ke functions as a mere co-ordinating conjunction, while in (Sa)
and (6a) ke induces a temporal and/or a resultative reading. The meaning of
ke is harder to define in (7) (cf. (3a) and (3b) above)) and in the sentences in
(8) ke preferably induces a contrastive or a ldenial-of-expectation' interpreta
tion, as it does in the corresponding English sentences, although this is
largely dependent on context and intonation (cf. also (3d) above).
The host of unexpected uses of ke includes its concessive use, its func
tion as a causal particle, the 'out-of-the-blue' ke (Canakis, 1995) and the
'double ke' construction, which relates to cither a focalizing or a concessive
function. In (9), the preferred interpretation is concessive
(9) 6e me akuse, ke tu ipa na proseksi
He didn't listen to me, and I told him to be careful.
while in (10) the preferred interpretation is 'causal', in the sense that the sec
ond conjunct is interpreted as providing the reason why the speaker has ut
tered the first conjunct:
(10) pame ke aryisame
lit. Let's go and we're late.
The examples in (11) are instances of the ('out-of-the-blue' or *a propos
of nothing' ke), since ke seems to contribute absolutely nothing to the inter
pretation of the sentences. Crucially, ke does not induce a presupposition, i.e.
(lla) does not necessarily mean that the speaker thinks that someone other
than Sophia came and (lib) does not necessarily mean that the speaker ex
pects the hearer to do anything other than give her a call.
(11) a. ir6e ke i sofia
lit. There came and Sophia,
b. pare ke kanena tilefono
lit. Give us and a call.
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Finally, the sentences in (12) are instances of what I term the 'double ke'
construction:
(12) a. pira mi la ke pira ke bananes
lit. I got apples and I got and bananas,
b. i stavrula den kseri orOoyrafia ke ine ke ylosoloyos
///. Stavroula doesn't know how to spell and she's and
a linguist.
The two examples in (12) have very different interpretations. In (12a)
the first ke seems to function as a mere co-ordinating conjunction, while the
second ke is prcsuppositional, with narrow scope over 'bananas'. This is not
the case in (12b), where we have a preferred overall concessive reading but
the second ke is by no means presuppositional, as no interpretation seems to
be induced whereby Stavroula is something else besides a linguist.
4 Semantic vs. Pragmatic Approaches
Within (neo-)Gricean pragmatics the tendency is for natural language con
nectives such as and, but, or, therefore to be treated as equivalent to the
corresponding logical connectives a, v, -> etc., and any additional functions
are taken to be a result of conventional or conversational implicaturc (Gricc,
1975, 1978); the temporal, resultative and other similar meanings/functions
of natural language connectives such as and are treated as implicata arising
from the application of maxims such as Manner ('Be orderly') etc. This type
of pragmatic analysis arguably falls short of instances of asymmetric con
junction such as those in (2), (5) and (6) above, especially in view of the age-
old argument that interpretive differences due to pragmatic processes are or
should be irrelevant to truth-conditions, a claim which is very obviously in
validated by e.g. (2d), (5b) and (6b) above.
As mentioned briefly in section 2.1, semantic approaches face two obvi
ous problems:
(i) the proliferation of distinct lexical meanings for connectives, which is
both conceptually and empirically unwarranted given the impossibility of
defining and delimiting the set of precise meanings for each connective (cf.
(3a), (3b) and (7) above)
(ii) the need for specific and often ad hoc syntactic/semantic mecha
nisms for blocking inappropriate meanings/interpretations, such as the notion
of semantic command (Bar-Lev and Palacas, 1980) or its more formal re
flexes in Segmented DRT (Asher and Lascartdes, 1998; Gomez Txurruka,
2003). The idea behind semantic command, a notion apparently modeled on
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syntactic c-command, is that in sentences such as (2c) above the temporal
reading is due to the fact that the first conjunct semantically commands the
second and hence all other readings (e.g. contrast, elaboration etc.) are
blocked. It is however hard to see why semantic command does not guaran
tee the temporal reading in all cases (cf. (3c) and (3d) above), or, worse, un
der what specific conditions the temporal reading is waived and another in
terpretation arises. The approach therefore seems highly stipulativc.
5 Towards a Unitary Radical Pragmatic Account
5.1 Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995)
This section will provide a very brief outline of basic tenets of Relevance
theory necessary for the purposes of my discussion. Let us begin by noting
that Relevance theory is a radical neo-Gricean pragmatic theory with a
strong cognitive orientation. The latter becomes immediately apparent in the
definition of the Communicative Principle of Relevance, which states that
every act of ostensive (overt) communication communicates a presumption
of its own optimal relevance, where an utterance (and/or an interpretation
thereof) is optimally relevant iff
(i) it achieves enough contextual effects to be worth the hearer's attention
(ii) it puts the hearer to no gratuitous effort in achieving those effects (Sper
ber and Wilson, 1986/1995).
The general idea is that a piece of information is relevant to an individ
ual if it has certain cognitive effects for that individual; such cognitive ef
fects include interaction with assumptions in the individual's mental context
to yield new implications (contextual implications); contradiction of an exist
ing assumption, which leads to its being abandoned, and strengthening of an
existing assumption by providing additional evidence for it.
The degree of relevance is a matter of cognitive effects and processing
effort; humans do not indulge in endless processing of a new piece of infor
mation, but they abandon the endeavour when the returns threaten not to
offset the effort. In other words, in processing an utterance the hearer opts
for an optimally relevant interpretation, i.e. one which yields adequate cogni
tive effects for the least cognitive effort, rather than a maximally relevant
one, i.e. an interpretation that maximizes cognitive effects at the cost of in
creased processing effort.
In other words, utterances, and ostensive stimuli in general, come with a
guarantee that the cognitive effects the speaker intends are sufficient to make
the stimulus worth processing and that the stimulus is the least costly in
terms of processing effort that the speaker could have chosen to have these
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effects, i.e. they come with a guarantee of optimal relevance. This has the
interesting consequence that the first interpretation which the hearer finds to
be consistent with the Principle of Relevance is taken to be the correct one,
i.e. the one intended by the speaker.
5.2 Pragmatic Enrichment and Truth-Conditions
A basic tenet of Relevance theory is that language is undcrdetermincd; in
other words, utterances are blueprints for propositions; truth-conditions are
assigned to pragmatically enriched utterances. Utterances are pragmatically
enriched via a process of inference constrained by the principle(s) of Rele
vance and the linguistic meaning plus the set of implicata necessary for the
establishment of truth-conditions are collectively termed the explicature of
an utterance (Carston, 1988, 1998, 2002; cf. the Gricean notion of conven
tional/generalized conversational implicature).
It follows that the truth-conditions of, e.g., (2c) will be different than
those of (2d) above, as the explicature of each utterance is different. At this
stage it is still unclear what the role of the connective is in establishing expli
cature and what the process of pragmatic enrichment entails.
5.3 Semantic Constraints on Relevance
Within this framework conncctives/particles/discourse markers like and or ke
function as semantic constraints on pragmatic interpretation (Blakemore,
1987, 1988; Blakemore and Carston, 1999) in that they act as guides delimit
ing the process of pragmatic interpretation/pragmatic enrichment and con
straining processing effort in particular ways. Connectives encode proce
dural rather than conceptual meaning, i.e. they point to specific ways in
which a preceding utterance can be relevant to what follows; in other words,
they point to types of relevance. Crucially, they may point to specific ways in
which the contextual assumptions or implicata associated with a preceding
utterance establish the relevance of a subsequent one (or vice-versa).
For instance, in Grice's famous example in (13):
(13) He is an Englishman; he is therefore brave.
the role of therefore is to indicate that the second utterance is to be inter
preted as a conclusion from the first utterance plus a premise/contextual as
sumption along the lines of *all Englishmen are brave*; therefore thus con
strains the range of potential contextual assumptions/implicata from the first
utterance to those intended by the speaker, in accordance with Relevance
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(Blakemore, 1987). In other words, the Principle of Relevance ensures cor
rect context selection at minimal cost in processing, and the particles referred
to as semantic constraints on relevance both aid in context selection and they
ensure the recovery of the correct/intended interpretation of the conjoined
proposition as a whole.
6 Back to the Greek Connective ke
It emerges from the preceding discussion that connectives/discourse particles
which induce semantic constraints on pragmatic interpretation do so in virtue
of (preferably) minimal and unitary semantic content and that they have
truth-conditional import in virtue of helping establish propositional content
(explicatures).
I propose that ke can be analyzed as a constraint with the semantic fea
ture additive as part of its lexical/procedural meaning; in this sense ke is nec
essarily focalizing and 'prcsuppositional' in that the constitucnt(s) over
which it takes scope must be interpreted as information which is additional to
information that is known or presupposed (cf. the analysis of also in Blake
more, 1987). Crucially, however, this need not be information that is linguis
tically encoded or mentioned in the discourse, but may be adduced as a con
textual assumption necessary for adequate, i.e. optimally relevant, pragmatic
interpretation (cf. the analysis of therefore in 5.3 above).
In this vein, the focalizing, causal, contrastive/concessive and even the
4out-of-the-blue' uses of ke can be accounted for if we assume that ke estab
lishes an inferential link whereby the propositional content of the utterance
containing it is interpreted as an addition to the implicata from the first con
junct.
More specifically, in (10), repeated below, the second conjunct can be
interpreted as singling out the main reason, the strongest among a host of
possible weak causal implicatures from the first conjunct.
(10) pame ke aryisame
///. Let's go and we're late.
Similarly, the contrastive or 'denial-of-expectation' interpretation of the con
joined utterances in (8), repeated below, arises if we assume that the second
conjunct provides/singles out the main reason, among a host of potential
implied others, for why Stavroula should be expected to know how to spell.
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(8) a. i stavrula den kseri orOoyrafia ke ine ylosoloyos
Stavroula doesn't know how to spell and she's a lin
guist,
b. i stavrula ine ylosoloyos ke den kseri orOoyrafia
Stavroula is a linguist and she doesn't know how to
spell.
What then of the more puzzling 'double ke' and *a propos of nothing
ke"? Let us first take another look at the data:
(12) a. pira mila ke pira ke bananes
lit. I got apples and I got and bananas,
b. i stavrula den kseri orOoyrafia ke ine kc ylosoloyos
lit. Stavroula doesn't know how to spell and she's and
a linguist.
In (12a) we can argue that the first ke merely conjoins the two utter
ances, while the second one takes narrow scope over 'bananas'. This is in
line with the basic semantic feature additive that we have assumed, and the
prcsuppositional reading follows. Note, however, that no such nar-
row/presuppositional reading can be assumed for (12b), as the intended in
terpretation is not 'Stavroula is a linguist and other things besides' (cf. the
discussion in 3 above); note, also, that either the second or the first ke can be
omitted:
(14) a. i stavrula den kseri orOoyrafia ke ine ylosoloyos
Stavroula doesn't know how to spell and she's a lin
guist.
b. A: den kscro orOoyrafia.
I don't know how to spell.
B: ise ke ylosoloyos
///. You're and a linguist.
We can, however, assume that the ke in (14b) does not necessarily take
narrow scope over 'linguist*, but over the whole sentence through Associa
tion with Focus, i.e. for the same reason why too in (15) below may take
narrow scope over the object DP, the VP, the subject DP or even the whole
IP (cf. Roolh, 1992):
(15) John cooked the pasta too
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Although research is still pending on the precise mechanics of Association
with Focus in Greek, we can extend the basic proposal for (14b) to the 'a
propos of nothing ke" in (11)
(11) a. ir6e ke i sofia
lit. There came and Sophia,
b. pare kc kanena tilefono
lit. Give us and a call.
and we can argue that rather than taking narrow scope over 'Sophia* or
'call1, the *out-of-the-blue' ke functions in precisely the same way as in
(12b) and in (14b), its role as a semantic constraint being to signal the addi
tion of a new assumption/premise to the context.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that some particularly resilient properties of natu
ral language connectives can be shown to be amenable to a pragmatic ac
count. The proposed analysis of some of the most salient properties of the
Greek connective ke brings together notions such as 'focalizing particle* and
'asymmetric conjunction' and recasts them within a radical pragmatic
framework which addresses the undcrdetcrminacy of linguistically encoded
meaning and views its enrichment as a dynamic pragmatic/cognitive process.
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